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Remedying the Remedy of Accounting
JOEL EIcIIENGRUN*
INTRODUCTION
The accounting would seem to be a straightforward, traditional remedy
used against the errant fiduciary. The true accounting remedy yields a res-
titutionary award of the defendant's profits wrongfully obtained from the
use of the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff must establish some basis for
the obligation to account, the defendant is ordered to account, and the
plaintiff then gets an order directing payment of the sum of money found
due. However, there are several different remedies called an "accounting,"
similar only in that all end in an order or judgment for the payment of
money. In addition to the true accounting, another remedy called an "ac-
counting" functionally grants a non-jury trial where accounts are complex
or mutual, and a now obsolete remedy, also called "accounting," granted
discovery in cases of disputed accounts. There has been a tendency among
courts and writers to lump together these situations and to describe all of
them as cases where an "accounting" is granted. The accounting has thus
been surrounded by a certain amount of confusion, which obscures the nature
of the remedy, its practical advantages, and the logic of extending the true
accounting remedy to non-fiduciary cases.
The purpose of this article is threefold: to untangle some of this confu-
sion; to refocus attention on the advantages and significance of the original
remedy; and to suggest some further applications of it. This article consists
of four sections, the first supplying a general historical overview. The second
section sets straight the semantic confusion by clearly defining what account-
ing is and is not. The third section discusses the allocation of the burdens
of proof when an accounting is granted, and demonstrates the advantages
and significance of the accounting when it is properly understood. These
advantages have been obscured by the traditional analysis and applications
of the remedy. With this interpretation in mind, the fourth and final section
urges a clarification in the law to include cases outside the scope of the tradi-
tional fiduciary relationship. This would extend the benefit of the accounting
to functionally identical situations, where the law should operate consistently.
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
The accounting evolved from a simple legal remedy to recover the income
from real property, held in a custodial relationship, to a broad equitable
* Associate Professor, Wake Forest University School of Law, A.B. 1969, Colgate Uni-
versity; J.D. 1972, Harvard Law School.
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remedy for the recovery of profits from the wrongful use of any property,
whether real or personal. This section traces the historical development of
the modern accounting from the twelfth century common law action of
account through the equitable remedy of accounting which superseded it.
This section of the paper shows the purpose for which account was created;
the operation of the accounting process; the theoretical basis of the action,
which is carried down to the present day remedy; and the procedural loop-
holes at law which led to the development in equity of the modern ac-
counting remedy. -This evolution both explains certain ambiguities in the
application of the remedy as it now exists and suggests certain opportunities
for expanding the remedy to meet modern needs-topics that are considered
in later sections.
The common law action of account was created in the twelfth or thirteenth
century in response to the need for a mechanism to allow recovery of an
unliquidated sum of money.' The particular problem that spawned account
was the inability of the feudal landowner to recover the net rents from one
who was in effect an agent appointed to manage the property and collect
the rents. In the practice of the time, lands would be granted out to the
agent, called a bailiff, who was obligated to account for the rents and
profits, less expenses. Although this obligation was a matter of custom and
perhaps oral agreement, nothing was reduced to writing. If the bailiff refused
to account for the net rents, no existing action contemplated recovery where
the landowner could not claim a definite, liquidated sum of money (debt);
specific, tangible personal property (detinue, replevin); or show a written
agreement under seal (covenant).2
The remedy in Account was a money judgment for the income or profit
earned from plaintiff's property. It involved a two-step procedure that could
be both long and complex. A plaintiff first had to plead and prove a
relationship obligating a defendant to account. If the plaintiff prevailed at
the first stage, an interlocutory judgment was entered ordering the defendant
to account for the income produced by the property. The actual process of
accounting to determine the amount due required a second proceeding. Both
parties appeared before auditors who conducted the proceeding like an
1. Belsheim, The Old Action of Account, 45 HARV. L. REV. 466, 467-72 (1932).
2. Id. The term "bailiff" was a label used to describe the relationship between the owner
of property and the agent to whom it was entrusted for the purpose of managing the property
to produce income for the owner. The legal consequence of the label was a finding that the
agent, as bailiff, was obligated to account for the income or profits from the property in
question. This usage, now antiquated, was common in England but not in the United States.
Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 2 HARv. L. REV. 241, 244-45 (1889), reprinted
in book form in A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION (1908). (Langdell writes about the
later, equitable remedy of accounting, but his comparisons with the action of account are
useful.) For a discussion of the fine points of who was and was not a bailiff, see Belsheim,
supra note 1, at 479-85.
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informal business meeting. Each party was required to support claims he
made as to sums or credits due him; claims which were in doubt were
submitted to a jury for determination. After the auditors considered and
settled all of the items presented, a final computation was made. If the result
showed a balance in favor of the plaintiff, it was submitted to the court
and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. If, however, there was a balance
in favor of the defendant, the action was dismissed. The defendant could
then bring an action of debt for the balance determined, the finding of the
auditors being regarded as capable of liquidating the affairs either way.3 The
basic outline of this procedure remains a characteristic of the modern ac-
counting remedy, where, as section III shows, each party has the burden of
proof to establish the credits or offsets he claims.
The common law action of account is noteworthy as the earliest example
of a restitutionary action, imposing on the defendant the obligation to disclose
and return profits from the use of the plaintiff's property to prevent unjust
enrichment. 4 The modern remedy retains this restitutionary feature. The theory
of the common law action was that the obligation to account arose out of
the relationship created between the parties where one received the property
of another to use and manage in the latter's behalf.' To establish this obliga-
tion, it was necessary to show both a fiduciary relationship between the par-
ties and the receipt of some property belonging to the plaintiff. The latter
requirement was detailed: the plaintiff had to own the property in the defend-
ant's possession; the defendant had to have some obligation beyond being
a mere bailee (otherwise the obligation would be to return the property); and
the defendant had to receive possession and control of the property, since
custody as a servant of the owner was insufficient.6 Once these requirements
were satisfied, the obligation to account was imposed as a matter of law,
quite independently of whether or not the parties had actually agreed to an
accounting at the inception of their relationship.
3. Belsheim, supra note 1, at 494-99.
4. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 426-28 (3d ed. 1923); Barbour, The
History of Contract in Early English Equity, in 4 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL
HISTORY 13, 13-14 (1914).
5. Belsheim, supra note 1, at 472-75; B. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 144-47 (3d ed.
1923). The relationship which supports the obligation to account has been characterized as
creating a "common law trust," midway between a trust relationship and an agency relationship.
Lile, Bills for Account, 8 VA. L. REv. 181, 193 (1922). It is analogous to the modern trust
which is also based on receipt of the property of another to be used in the other's behalf.
Indeed, account was one of the two sources from which equity courts later developed the
trust. See generally 1 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 12 (3d ed. 1967). Technically, the
distinction between the relationship which gives rise to the obligation to account and that of
the trust relationship turns on who has title to the property in question. If title is in the one
who receives the property a trust may arise, id. at § 2.6, but if title remains with the entruster,
the obligation to account arises. Langdell, supra note 2, at 245.
6. Langdell, supra note 2, at 243-50.
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Account expanded from its origins as an action against manorial bailiffs
and was held to lie in a variety of other situations where an owner of real
or personal property delivered it to another to be used or employed for the
owner's benefit.7 As the action became more widely used, the procedure at
law for enforcing the order to account broke down. Even though specific
enforcement was available at law, it was ineffective. The law courts could
issue a writ of capias, ordering the defendant seized and imprisoned until
the accounting was completed; however, the defendant could obtain release
by posting bail and might thereby avoid accounting (if willing to forfeit the
bail).8 Without an accounting, a plaintiff could not show a liquidated sum
due him, and without a liquidated sum, there could be no recovery. Thus,
the remedy could be thwarted by precisely the circumstances that necessitated
its creation in the first place.
Even when the defendant appeared for the accounting, the procedure
might become so cumbersome that it denied effective relief. This was partly
a function of the then-existing system of trial by jury and partly a function
of a more general inflexibility of common law procedure in the face of the
need for change. Each item disputed before the auditors was framed as a
separate issue for the jury, and trial by wager of law was still possible. 9 The
common law jury itself was hardly an asset. Originally, evidence of facts in
issue in common law actions was gathered from jurors themselves, who were
thought of as witnesses who judged from facts within their knowledge. This
concept of the jurors' function continued into the fifteenth century, when
feudal society had become more mobile, and in reality jurors might no longer
have firsthand knowledge of the dispute. Venue was limited, because the
common law courts refused to take cognizance of acts or transactions which
occurred abroad. Similarly, neither joinder of parties plaintiff nor joinder
of multiple causes of action was permitted. Thus, account was hampered
by problems associated with all common law actions of the time, some of
which were particularly troublesome in commercial cases where the action
was increasingly brought. 10
Chancery began to take jurisdiction of cases for an accounting at the end
of the fifteenth century, offering a remedy that avoided the disadvantages
of the legal action, and eventually the common law action of account
declined into obsolescence.' Equity could enforce the order to account
without difficulty, for it had well-developed authority and procedures for
specific enforcement. If a defendant were imprisoned for failure to account,
there he stayed until he obeyed the order. Equity also offered a remedy that
was relatively quick, without technical pleading or venue requirements, where
7. Belsheim, supra note I, at 476-85; J. AMES, Lecture XI, Account, in LECTURES IN LEGAL
HISTORY 116, 117-18 (1913).
8. Belsheim, supra note I, at 472, 496-97.
9. See Belsheim, supra note 1, at 497-500.
10. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 278-88 (1924).
11. Id.
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evidence was obtained from the parties and their witnesses under oath, and
where joinder of both multiple parties and multiple claims was permitted.
Mechanically, the actual accounting process in equity differed little from
that at law. A plaintiff had first to establish a basis for the remedy, and
disputed issues of fact might be sent to the" law courts for determination by
jury trial. The case was then referred to a master in equity, rather than to
auditors at law, for the actual accounting process. 2 The accounting thus
evolved into a general equitable remedy to recover the income from another's
property wrongfully retained by the fiduciary. The procedure remains es-
sentially the same when an accounting is sought today. 3
II. THE MODERN ACCOUNTING REMEDY
This section relates the origins of the accounting remedy to ambiguities
in its application today, and in so doing elucidates various commonly ac-
cepted meanings of "an accounting." As the remedy expanded in equity,
so, too, did the use of the term "accounting." By the nineteenth century,
the remedy had taken on a different shape, and the term "accounting" was
used to describe what were in fact several different remedies. No longer was
accounting limited to cases where a fiduciary refused to account for income
or profits from the use of another's property. It developed into a general
remedy to determine and recover an unliquidated sum of money and was
widely used in cases of disputed accounts in commercial situations.14 These
might be cases where the accounts between the parties were complicated or
where there were mutual accounts, or cases where discovery was needed.
Each of these fact situations came to be recognized as further categories
where equity would grant "an accounting."'"
12. Langdell, supra note 2, at 258.
13. The modern procedure is described in section II(A) and its advantages analyzed in
section III. For a good description of the accounting process in operation, see Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Antioch Theatre, 52 Il. App. 3d 122, 367 N.E.2d 247 (1977).
14. 1 J. POMEROY, POMEROY's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 186(a) (5th ed. 1941); Devlin, Jury
Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM.
L. REv. 43, 70 (1980).
15. E.g., 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 14, § 1421 ("The instances in which the legal remedies
are held to be inadequate, and therefore a suit in equity for an accounting proper, are: 1.
Where there are mutual accounts between the plaintiff and the defendant. . . . 2. Where the
accounts are all on one side, but there are circumstances of great complication, or difficulties
in the way of adequate relief at law .... 3. Where a fiduciary relation exists between the
parties, and a duty rests upon the defendant to render an account."); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 423-504 (1836) (reprint ed. 1972); 9 C. WRu-rr & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2310 (1971); accord Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Keystate Ins.
Agency, Inc., 420 Pa. 578, 581, 218 A.2d 294, 296 (1966) ("Appellant's brief correctly states
that 'Equity takes jurisdiction only when the accounts are mutual or complicated or when
discovery is needed and is material to the relief.' . . . [But] [i]n the instant case, the working
relationship of the parties necessarily imposed a trustee's obligation on the agent to account
to the principal for money collected."); see also, Goffe & Clarkener v. Lyons Milling Co., 26
F.2d 801 (D. Kan. 1928); Lorsch v. Gibraltar Mut. Casualty Co., 127 Ill. App. 2d 350, 262
N.E.2d 313 (1970); State v. Cote, 95 N.H. 428, 65 A.2d 280 (1949); Huebener v. Chinn, 186
Or. 508, 207 P.2d 1136 (1949); 1 AM. JuR. 2D Accounts and Accounting § 51 (1962); 1 C.J.S.
Accounting § 14 (1936).
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The relief gfanted is different in cases where profits are sought from a
fiduciary for the use of property, on the one hand, and in cases of disputed
accounts, on the other hand. '6 But for the fact that the ultimate relief in both
situations is an order to pay money, one might say there are two or three distinct
remedies subsumed under the name of "accounting." The succeeding parts
of this section discuss these remedies in turn, starting with the one applied
in fiduciary relatibnships. This is the purest and simplest example of the
accounting, and the oiie mo!ftin conformity with historical principles. Next,
two other situations are considered where it is commonly said that an
"accounting" is granted: where accounts are complex and where accounts
are mutual. The real remedy in these cases is not an accounting, but rather
a settlement of a dispute over accounts, in equity, with a non-jury trial.
Thus, these situations differ from the traditional fiduciary accounting which
grants a restitutionary award of a defendant's profits. Finally, consideration
is given to a group of cases where an "accounting" was a means of discovery,
that is, cases where there was little or no relationship between the use of
the term accounting and the technical remedy it was originally meant to
describe.
A. Distinguishing the Real Remedy: Accounting for Profits
Where the Defendant Is a Fiduciary
The traditional use of the accounting is in cases brought against the express
trustee, who may be compelled to give an account of his stewardship.' 7
However, the remedy is of much broader application today, since it is
available whenever the defendant is a fiduciary who has been entrusted with
property of some kind belonging to the plaintiff. Legion are the cases where
a party found to occupy a fiduciary relationship may be held to account
for the profits or income of property received.'" These cases are in one sense
the direct descendants of the old action of account, although the history
16. Part of the confusion surrounding the accounting remedy is the dual use of the word
"account." The word "account" is used to signify the remedy in question ("an accounting"),
but it is also used in the commercial sense of an account receivable or account payable. There
is no way around this confusion except the understanding that the term "accounting" describes
both a remedy which awards the profits of a wrongdoer as well as a quite different remedy
which resolves disputed accounts between the parties. This will become clearer as the different
remedies are described below.
17. See G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 963-68 (rev. 2d ed. 1983).
18. Cases are collected in 1 AM. JuR. 2D Accounts and Accounting § 52 (1962); 1 C.J.S.
Accounting § 19 (1936); Langdell, supra note 2, at 259-67; RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY §§ 382,
339 (1933); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 436 (1957); Annot., 81 A.L.R.2D 1420 (1962);
Annot., 65 A.L.R.2D 521 (1959); Annot., 55 A.L.R.2D 1391 (1957); Annot., 3 A.L.R.2D 1310
(1949); Annot., 169 A.L.R. 946 (1947); Annot., 153 A.L.R. 663 (1944); Annot., 143 A.L.R.
1211 (1943); Annot., 79 A.L.R. 201 (1932); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 815 (1928); Annot., 50 A.L.R.
1301 (1927); Annot., 46 A.L.R. 138 (1927); Annot., 45 A.L.R. 519 (1926); Annot., 7 A.L.R.
1365 (1920); see also, Douthwaite, Profits and Their Recovery, 15 VILL. L. REv. 346 (1970).
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of the modern law of fiduciaries is a more complex tale.' 9 In any event,
equity would grant the accounting remedy whenever a fiduciary relationship
was established, and this remains a basis for obtaining an accounting today.
An examination of the basis for a fiduciary relationship is beyond the
scope of this article, but a few highlights are useful to flesh out the range
of situations where the accounting may be profitably sought. Virtually any
kind of relationship may be deemed fiduciary on the facts of a particular
case, be it a social, business, or public relationship. The following have been
held to account as fiduciaries: express trustee, guardian, executor or ad-
ministrator, agent, servant, employer, employee, joint venturer, co-owner of
property (joint tenant/tenant in common), real estate broker, stockbroker,
investment advisor, mortgagee in possession, escrow holder, pledgee, cor-
porate officer or director, and government office holders.20 And, in some
circumstances, even a third-party wrongdoer who knowingly profits from
the breach of a fiduciary's duty may also be held to account.2'
When the accounting remedy is granted, the burden of proof is allocated
to the plaintiff on certain fact issues and to the defendant on others. The
plaintiff must establish some substantive basis for an accounting.2 He must
also prove all gross amounts claimed from the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff
must show that some property was entrusted to the defendant's care, so that
there is something to account for,23 and he must also show the amount or
value of that property.24 If profits from the use of the property are sought,
19. See generally Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 795 (1983); Shepherd, Towards
a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L.Q. REv. 51 (1981).
20. A good survey of the cases is contained in 0. BOGERT, supra note 17, § 481 (rev. ed.
1978).
21. E.g., County of Cook v. Lynch, 560 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (realtor who bribed
county tax assessor to obtain lower rates and charged clients a percentage of the savings must
account for profits); Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ala.
1968) (various third parties who profited from use of assets of express trust held accountable);
Mullaney, Wells & Co. v. Savage, 78 Ill. 2d 534, 402 N.E.2d 574 (1980) (partner of employee
who breached fiduciary duty by acquiring business opportunity must also account for profits);
Kelley v. Porter, 357 Mass. 780, 260 N.E.2d 147 (1970) (purchaser of trust property accountable
for profits made on resale); Marcus v. Marcus, 92 A.D.2d 887, 459 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1983)
(husband and third party to whom he transferred marital property must account to wife);
accord, G. BOGERT, supra note 16, § 868 (rev. 2d ed. 1982).
22. E.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier, 489 F. Supp. 354 (D. Utah 1977); Cafritz v. Corporation
Audit Co., 60 F. Supp. 627 (D.D.C. 1945); Worley v. Worley, 388 So. 2d 502 (Ala. 1980);
Donahue v. Barnes, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 64, 265 A.2d 87 (1969), petition denied, 158 Conn. 656,
259 A.2d 139 (1969); Couco v. Galante, 6 N.J. 128, 77 A.2d 793 (1951); Stockmen's Ins.
Agency, Inc. v. Guarantee Reserve Life Ins. Co., 217 N.W.2d 455 (N.D. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974); Dobry v. Dobry, 324 P.2d 534 (Okla. 1958); Doyle v. Jack Mathis Gen.
Contracts, Inc., 253 Or. 57, 453 P.2d 174 (1969); Kohr v. Kohr, 271 Pa. Super. 321, 413 A.2d
687 (1979).
23. E.g., Bruce Lincoln-Mercury Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 325 F.2d 2 (3d Cir.
1963); Warren County v. Elmore, 250 Iowa 348, 93 N.W.2d 756 (1958); Physicians & Hospitals
Supply Co. v. Johnson, 231 Minn. 548, 44 N.W.2d 224 (1950).
24. E.g., Hodson v. Hodson, 292 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 1974); Physicians & Hospitals
Supply Co. v. Johnson, 231 Minn. 548, 44 N.W.2d 224 (1950); Dobry v. Dobry, 324 P.2d 534
(Okla. 1958).
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the plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish the gross amount of such
profits. 25 The defendant, in turn, has the burden of proof to establish
expenses, losses or other deductions which it is claimed reduce the amount
due the plaintiff.26 It will be presumed that funds or property unaccounted
for were misappropriated, and expenses unexplained were not incurred, with
all inferences resolved against the defendant on these issues. 27 The operation
of the burdens of proof can be simply illustrated. If, for example, the
plaintiff establishes a fiduciary relationship entitling him to an accounting
of the defendant but fails to prove the amount of funds delivered to the
defendant or the defendant's gross profits, the plaintiff recovers nothing
because he has failed to meet his burden of proof. Conversely, if the
defendant claims expenses but fails to support these claims with adequate
evidence, the plaintiff recovers the gross amount proven because the defend-
ant has failed to meet his burden of proof. This shared burden of proof
offers tactical advantages to the plaintiff, advantages which make the ac-
counting an attractive remedial choice. These are discussed in section III.
B. Settling Disputed Accounts: An "Accounting" Because
Accounts Are Too Complex for a Jury To Understand
Equity took jurisdiction over cases of disputed accounts to grant "an
accounting" when the accounts were complex or mutual and as a result the
dispute could not be effectively settled at law. Such a remedy remains
available today, but it is not the same as the true accounting just discussed.
While the court determines the amount due and grants an order for the
payment of money in these cases, the real remedy is a non-jury trial. There
is no question of accounting for the income or profits from a plaintiff's
25. E.g., Pallma v. Fox, 182 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, C.J.) ("Nor does the
defendants' failure to account for the 'bulk revenues' throw any burden of proof on
[defendants].... Upon any accounting, [the defendant] does indeed have the burden of proving
any credits, if they are challenged; but the [plaintiff] has the burden of proving all 'surcharges'
and in the case at bar we are concerned only with those. Therefore the plaintiffs had the
burden throughout." Id. at 900. "Surcharge" is an old equity term meaning those items claimed
by the party seeking the accounting.); Bennett v. Gardner, 133 Colo. 33, 291 P.2d 705 (1955);
Thamert v. Carter, 72 Idaho 515, 245 P.2d 145 (1952); Potts v. Lux, 168 Kan. 387, 214 P.2d
277 (1950); Barar v. Phillips, 328 Mich. 267, 43 N.W.2d 846 (1950); Bednarsh v. Winshall, 2
Mich. App. 355, 139 N.W.2d 889 (1966); Barthuly v. Barthuly, 192 Neb. 610, 223 N.W.2d
429 (1974); Vinlis Constr. Co. v. Roreck, 30 A.D.2d 668, 291 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1968), modified,
27 N.Y.2d 687, 262 N.E.2d 215, 314 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1970).
26. E.g., Mollohan v. Christy, 80 Ariz. 141, 294 P.2d 375 (1956); Craig v. Baggs, 64 Ga.
App. 850, 14 S.E.2d 156 (1941); Dunn v. Baugh, 95 Idaho 236, 506 P.2d 463 (1973); Meier
v. Johannsen, 242 Iowa 665, 47 N.W.2d 793 (1951); Anderson v. Clemens Mobile Homes,
Inc., 214 Neb. 283, 333 N.W.2d 900 (1983); Vinlis Constr. Co. v. Roreck, 30 A.D.2d 668,
291 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1968), modified, 27 N.Y.2d 687, 262 N.E.2d 215, 314 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1970);
Watson v. Fulk, 19 N.C. App. 377, 198 S.E.2d 730 (1973); Simper v. Scorup, 78 Utah 71, 1
P.2d 941 (1931); Haueter v. Budlow, 256 Wis. 561, 42 N.W.2d 261 (1950).
27. See Meier v. Johannsen, 242 Iowa 665, 47 N.W.2d 793 (1951); Vinlis Constr. Co. v.
Roreck, 30 A.D.2d 668, 291 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1968), modified, 27 N.Y.2d 687, 262 N.E.2d 215,
314 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1970); Simper v. Scorup, 78 Utah 71, 1 P.2d 941 (1931).
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property as in the fiduciary cases. Today a non-jury trial still may be obtained
on either of these grounds in state courts. The complex account cases are
discussed first, and a discussion of the mutual account cases follows.
The process of accounting developed in fiduciary cases was useful for
settling disputed commercial accounts. It was a process in which an account
could be examined, the various items of charge and credit resolved, and
judgment entered for a single, liquidated balance due from one side or the
other. However, as shown in the introductory section, the process available
in the common law action of account at law might be extraordinarily time
consuming. 28 Auditors were appointed to take the account, but, as late as
the eighteenth century, each disputed item still had to be framed as a separate
issue for trial by jury. If there were numerous items there might be numerous
trials, with the possibility of different juries reaching inconsistent results.
Thus, the English courts of chancery took jurisdiction over complex cases
of disputed accounts to grant a more effective remedy because of procedural
difficulties at law.29 The case was referred to a master who would go through
the entire account, noting disputed items and reserving them for later res-
olution as a whole by the court.
The American courts, beginning in the nineteenth century, detached the
accounting process from its fiduciary moorings and made it available when-
ever accounts were too difficult for a jury to understand. The name of the
process became the name of the remedy, and a new remedy called "ac-
counting" was created. The basis for relief today is different from that in
the earlier English cases. An "accounting" is now granted whenever accounts
are so complex that a jury cannot understand them.30 As Mr. Justice Harlan
explained in one early case:
The complicated nature of the accounts between the parties constitutes
itself a sufficient ground for going into equity. It would have been
28. See supra text accompanying notes 3-10.
29. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry Into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation,
128 U. PA. L. REv. 829, 847-48 (1980); Devlin, Jury Trials of Complex Cases: English Practice
at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 43, 65-68 (1980). These articles
examine the early English accounting cases as part of an effort to answer the question of
whether there is a historical basis for a general "complexity exception" to the constitutional
right to a jury trial. Lord Devlin argues for such an exception, and Professor Arnold argues
against it. However, both agree that the English chancery courts of the eighteenth century
found the remedy in the common law action of account inadequate because of the jury trial
procedures, not because of the jurors' inability to understand the issues.
On the broader question of an exception to the constitutional right of trial by jury in complex
civil litigation, the Third Circuit in an antitrust case had held there may be such an exception,
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980), while the Ninth
Circuit in a securities case has held there is no such exception, In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Grant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
The issue has generated a substantial debate in the academic journals, much of it collected and
summarized in Kirst, The Jury's Historic Domain in Complex Cases, 58 WASH. L. REv. 1
(1982).
30. The early cases are collected in 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 14, § 1421; 1 AM. JUR. 2D
Accounts and Accounting § 53 (1962); 1 C.J.S. Accounting 18(c) (1936).
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difficult, if not impossible, for a jury to unravel the numerous trans-
actions involved in the settlements between the parties, and reach a
satisfactory conclusion as to the amount of drawbacks to which Alexander
& Co. were entitled on each settlement .... Justice could not be done
except by employing the methods of investigation peculiar to courts of
equity."
This new "accounting" remedy is similar in appearance to the true account-
ing; the accounting process is used and, like the true accounting, it ends in
a money award once the accounts are settled. However, in contrast to the
true accounting, the remedy in cases of complex accounts is not restitution-
ary; that is, there is no award of a defendant's profits from the wrongful
use of another's property. Complexity of accounts also becomes something
of a catch-all category for equity settling cases of disputed accounts. Avoiding
a multiplicity of lawsuits was once a ground for equitable relief, and some-
times cases of disputed accounts which would otherwise require multiple
suits at law were heard in equity under the rubric of complex accounts.32
The "accounting" remedy in such cases is now obsolete, since liberal joinder
of both parties and claims is now generally permitted.
Subject to evolving constitutional jury trial requirements, complexity of
accounts remains a basis for obtaining a non-jury trial in state courts. 3
There is no clear standard for determining when a case is too complex for
a jury. The question is decided on a case-by-case basis, and the results seem
to reflect differing individual views of jury competence. The courts which
grant a non-jury trial tend to focus on the facts which they feel put the case
beyond the jury's understanding: two hundred separate accounts each re-
quiring numerous entries and calculations; 34 several thousand accounts; 35
forty-five separate insurance policies written by twenty-two insurance com-
panies covering a large amount and variety of personal property; 36 or work
31. Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887).
32. Minch v. Winters, 122 Kan. 533, 253 P. 578 (1927); Raleigh County Court v. Cottle,
81 W. Va. 469, 94 S.E. 948 (1918); see County of Dallas v. Timberlake, 54 Ala. 403 (1875);
Dyer Bros. Golden West Iron Works v. Central Iron Works, 182 Cal. 588, 189 P. 445 (1920);
J. DAWSON & G. PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION 146-48 (2d ed. 1969); cf Pennefeather v.
Baltimore Steam-Packet Co., 58 F. 481 (C.C.D. Md. 1893).
33. Comer v. Birmingham News Co., 218 Ala. 360, 118 So. 806 (1928); McGraw, Perkins
& Webber Co. v. Yates, 175 Ark. 220, 298 S.W. 1001 (1927); Ely v. King-Richardson Co.,
265 I11. 148, 106 N.E. 619 (1914); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Antioch Theater, 52 II1. App.
3d 122, 367 N.E.2d 247 (1977); Williams v. Herring, 183 Iowa 127, 165 N.W. 342 (1917);
Lapham v. Kan. & Tex. Oil, Gas & Pipeline Co., 87 Kan. 65, 123 P. 863 (1912); Johnson &
Higgins, Inc. v. Simpson, 165 Md. 83, 166 A. 617 (1933); Kimmerle v. Dowagiac Gas Co.,
159 Mich. 34, 123 N.W. 565 (1909); McKinley v. Durbin, 231 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. App. 1950);
State v. Cote, 95 N.H. 428, 65 A.2d 280 (1949); Huebener v. Chinn, 186 Or. 508, 207 P.2d
1136 (1949); Corbin v. Madison, 12 Wash. Ct. App. 318, 529 P.2d 1145 (1974); Dankmer v.
City Ice & Fuel Co., 111 W. Va. 676, 163 S.E. 430 (1932); see Second Mich. Coop. Hous.
Assoc. v. First Mich. Coop. Hous. Assoc., 358 Mich. 252, 99 N.W.2d 665 (1959); Stuyvesant
Ins. Co. v. Keystate Ins. Agency, 420 Pa. 578, 218 A.2d 294 (1966).
34. Lorsch v. Gibraltar Mut. Casualty Co., 127 II1. App. 2d 350, 262 N.E.2d 313 (1970).
35. Comer v. Birmingham News Co., 218 Ala. 360, 118 So. 806 (1928).
36. Jay-Bee Realty Corp. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 320 II1. App. 310, 50 N.E.2d 973 (1943).
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performed on a cost-plus basis under eight different trade names for six
different state institutions over a two-year period. 37 The courts which deny
an "accounting," and thus deny a non-jury trial, have more of a tendency
to generalize what is and what is not complex for a jury. Some of the
reasons given include: numerous items or a long account alone do not a
complex account make;3 calculations which involve only simple arithmetic
do not alone make for complexity; 39 and a jury trial will not be denied
merely because there are complicated questions of fact involving figures
difficult to carry into the mind. 40 While one might speculate that the more
recent cases would show a greater willingness to let the jury decide difficult
issues, no such pattern emerges.
The willingness of courts to grant a non-jury trial because of the difficulty
of accounts is changing, and as a result the presence of complex accounts
no longer guarantees a non-jury trial. At least in the federal courts, one
may now conclude that the remedy of an "accounting" no longer exists in
cases of complex accounts. Such is the clear implication of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood.41 The Court held
that the defendant was constitutionally entitled to a jury trial of the plaintiff's
claim for an accounting for the wrongful use of a trademark, sought as
incidental to an injunction. Heavy reliance was placed on Rule 53(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the use of a master
to aid the jury in actions where the issues are complicated.42 The master's
findings in such cases are admissible as evidence and may be read to the
jury, but the ultimate determination of the issues remains with the jury.4
The Court reasoned that with the master to aid a jury, "it will indeed be
a rare case" in which the issues are too complicated for jury trial. 44 Sub-
sequent lower court decisions have found few, if any, such cases. 45 The
37. State v. Cote, 95 N.H. 428, 65 A.2d 280 (1949).
38. Williams v. Herring, 183 Iowa 127, 165 N.W. 342 (1917); Huebener v. Chinn, 186 Or.
508, 207 P.2d 1136 (1949).
39. Schneider v. Wilmington Trust Co., 310 A.2d 897 (Del. Ch. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 320 A.2d 709 (Del. 1974).
40. Gatudy v. Acme Constr. Co., 196 Wash. 562, 83 P.2d 889 (1938).
41. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) provides as follows:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to
be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated;
in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult
computation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that
some exceptional condition required it.
43. FED. R. Crv. P. 53(e)(3) provides as follows:
In an action to be tried by a jury the master shall not be directed to report
the evidence. His findings upon the issues submitted to him are admissible as
evidence of the matters found and may be read to the jury, subject to the ruling
of the court upon any objections in point of law which may be made to the
report.
44. 369 U.S. at 478.
45. The cases are collected in 5 J. MooRE, J. LucAs & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 38.25 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE]; 9 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2310 (1971).
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impact of the Dairy Queen reasoning in state courts is unclear. About half
of the states have a provision identical or nearly identical to Rule 53 for
dealing with complex issues without denying a jury trial.4 6 To the extent that
state courts follow the federal approach to jury trial questions, 47 they may
reach the same result when confronted with questions of complex accounts.
C. Settling Disputed Accounts: An "Accounting"
Because Accounts Are Mutual
Equity also took jurisdiction over cases of disputed accounts to grant "an
accounting" when there were mutual accounts between the parties. Accounts
are mutual when each of the parties has an account with the other and there
are mutual demands, which is to be distinguished from the case where there
is one account with both debits and credits. 48 Paralleling complex accounts,
the mutual account is another situation where the process of accounting is
used to resolve disputed accounts which could not be effectively settled at
law. Here, too, the name of the process becomes the name of the remedy,
and a new kind of "accounting" is created. Functionally, the real relief is
a non-jury trial, granted whenever a court feels the dispute is beyond the
understanding of jurors.
Mutual accounts present a problem of complex accounts, in the sense that
the process of offsetting the respective demands is intricate and difficult.
As in cases of complex accounts, the "accounting" remedy here utilizes the
accounting process to settle these mutual demands and to award the victor
a money judgment. No fiduciary relationship need be shown, nor is there
any restitutionary award of a defendant's profits. The test applied by the
46. There are 22 states that follow FED. R. Civ. P. 53 and provide for jury trial in complex
cases. In addition, four other states provide for jury trial in cases where the remedy of an
accounting is sought. The states following the pattern of Federal Rule 53 are: Alabama, ALA.
R. Civ. P. 53; Arizona, ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 53; Colorado, CoLo. R. Crv. P. 53; District of
Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-946 (1970); Idaho, IDAHO R. Civ. P. 53; Indiana, IND. RULES
TRIAL P. 53; Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-253 (1964); Maine, ME. R. Civ. P. 53; Massa-
chusetts, MAss. R. Civ. P. 53; Minnesota, MINN. R. Civ. P. 53; Missouri, Mo. R. Civ. P.
68; Montana, MoNr. R. Civ. P. 53; Nevada, NEV. R. Crv. P. 53; New Jersey, N.J. R. Civ.
P. 4:41; New Mexico, N.M. R. Civ. P. 53; North Dakota, N.D. R. Civ. P. 53; Rhode Island,
R.I. R. Civ. P. 53; South Dakota, S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15-6-53 (1966); Utah, UTAH R.
Civ. P. 53; Vermont, VT. R. Cirv. P. 53; Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 805.06 (West 1976);
Wyoming, Wyo. R. Civ. P. 53.
The four states which provide for jury trial in accounting cases, though not in the manner of
Federal Rule 53, are: North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I, Rule 53 (1983); Pennsylvania,
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1513 (Purdon 1975) (advisory jury can be used in equity cases);
South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-31-10, 15-31-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976); West Virginia, W.
VA. CODE §§ 56-7-1, 56-7-10 (1966).
47. For an analysis of the constitutional right to jury trial and the different approaches
adopted by federal and state courts, see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 8.1-8.11
(2d ed. 1977).
48. Goffe & Clarkener v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d 801 (D. Kan. 1928); Wright v. Saddler,
255 Ala. 101, 50 So. 2d 235 (1951); Lapham v. Kan. & Tex. Oil, Gas & Pipeline Co., 87 Kan.
65, 123 P. 863 (1912); 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 14, § 1421.
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American courts to determine whether to grant an "accounting" is the same
in both situations. When mutual accounts are in dispute, an equitable "ac-
counting" is granted if the issues are thought to be too difficult for a jury
to understand. 49 The standard again is subjective, and the decisions again
reflect differing views of confidence in the jury. One problem particular to
the mutual account cases is that occasionally a court will get caught up in
discussing mutual accounts and lose sight of the underlying issue of whether
a jury can follow the matter. For example, this seems to have occurred in
one case involving a dispute over monies due under a construction contract.50
The plaintiff-contractor sued for the balance of the contract price, and the
defendant-owner counterclaimed for sums due him under the contract. The
court held there was no right to a jury trial because the case was properly
one for an "accounting," but the court appears to have been overly con-
cerned with the mutuality of the accounts. The case as described, involving
only the set-off of two claims, seems easily understood by a jury:
Looking to all of the allegations of these pleadings, we cannot escape
the conclusion that they raise issues determinable as for an accounting
by a court of equity. These items are numerous and complicated and
consist of mutual demands made by the parties, each against the other.
... That these items claimed by each of the parties against the other
are items of mutual account, in a legal sense, seems plain when we
remember that, by the very terms of the contract above noticed, it was
manifestly contemplated that such claims, so far as they are just and
valid, should be regarded as mutual; that is, that they should be offset
in favor of each party against the other for purpose of determining any
balance due from either party to the other.5'
Overall, the use of the "accounting" remedy to settle mutual accounts is
no longer very significant. While mutuality of accounts is frequently dis-
cussed,5 2 there are relatively few cases where an "accounting" is actually
sought on this ground.5" From a reading of the decisions, it seems that the
courts are more receptive to the argument that a non-jury trial should be
granted on the ground that the accounts are complex, 54 perhaps because it
49. Goffe & Clarkener v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d 801 (D. Kan. 1928); Wright v. Saddler,
255 Ala. 101, 50 So. 2d 235 (1951); Schneider v. Wilmington Trust Co., 310 A.2d 897 (Del.
Ch. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 320 A.2d 709 (Del. 1974); Richman v. Richman, 190 Iowa
462, 180 N.W. 182 (1920); Gresty v. Briggs, 127 Kan. 151, 272 P. 178 (1928); Lapham v. Kan.
& Tex. Oil, Gas & Pipeline Co., 87 Kan. 65, 123 P. 863 (1912); Garey v. City of Pasco, 89
Wash. 382, 154 P. 433 (1916); see Dunigan v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Miss. 809, 80 So. 276
(1919).
50. Garey v. City of Pasco, 89 Wash. 382, 154 P. 433 (1916).
51. Id. at 385, 154 P. at 434.
52. E.g., Williams v. Finlaw, Mueller & Co., 292 Pa. 244, 141 A. 47 (1928).
53. See cases cited supra note 49.
54. Goffe & Clarkener v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d 801 (D. Kan. 1928) (accounts not
mutual but too complex for a jury); Farr v. Southern Supply Co., 253 Ala. 281, 44 So. 2d
247 (1950) (accounts mutual and complex; either ground supports non-jury trial); Richman v.
Richman, 190 Iowa 462, 180 N.W. 182 (1920) (accounts must be both mutual and complex
for equity to take the case); Lapham v. Kan. & Tex. Oil, Gas & Pipeline Co., 87 Kan. 65,
123 P. 863 (1912) (account not mutual but it is a long (e.g., complex) account; no right to
jury trial).
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goes more directly to the underlying issue. In addition to the paucity of
decisions, this remedy is now obsolete in the federal courts. An "accounting"
to settle mutual accounts is functionally indistinguishable from an "account-
ing" to settle complex accounts, where a jury trial is now constitutionally
required.5 1 Since the real remedy in mutual account is a non-jury trial, one
must conclude that this "accounting" remedy no longer exists in the federal
courts.
D. Settling Disputed Accounts: An "Accounting"
To Order Discovery
Equity also granted the remedy of an "accounting" when one of the
parties to an action at law sought discovery in a case of disputed accounts.
This is but one of many situations where equity took jurisdiction to order
discovery in the days before the procedure at law was reformed to provide
for pretrial disclosure. 56 The court would order the disclosure sought and
then usually dismiss the case.5 7 Use of the term accounting here is coinci-
dental, and describes a class of cases where discovery would be ordered. It
would be preferable, though more cumbersome, to refer to "the granting
of discovery in cases of disputed accounts."
One would imagine this basis for an accounting to be obsolete today,
with the need for relief gone. Even in those jurisdictions retaining separate
law and equity courts, the same discovery is usually available in both. 8 Yet,
some confusion remains. Occasionally a party will seek an "accounting" on
the ground that he is unable to determine an amount due where the opponent
has the relevant books and records. The courts have usually been quick to
point out that discovery is available and deny an accounting for that purpose
only. 5
9
This section has shown that the modern accounting remedy is actually
several different remedies collected under the same name. The true accounting
is the restitutionary remedy which awards to the plaintiff the defendant's
profits from the use of the plaintiff's property. The "accounting" in cases
of complex or mutual accounts is a device to obtain a non-jury trial, now
obsolete in federal courts. The "accounting" to obtain discovery, now also
obsolete, had nothing to do with accounting and all to do with discovery.
The sections that follow focus on the true accounting remedy, consider
55. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
56. 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 14, §§ 191-200.
57. Id. §§ 223-30.
58. E.g., DEL. CHANCERY RULES 26-37 (patterned on FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37).
59. Arnold Productions, Inc. v. Favorite Films Corp., 298 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1961); Kirksey
Motors, Inc. v. General Acceptance Corp., 276 Ala. 270, 161 So. 2d 475 (1964); Burr v. State
Bank, 344 Il1. App. 332, 100 N.E.2d 773 (1951); Terner v. Glickstein & Terner, Inc., 283 N.Y.
299, 28 N.E.2d 846 (1940); Huebener v. Chinn, 186 Or. 508, 207 P.2d 1136 (1949); see Wheeler
v. Benson-Taylor, Inc., 394 P.2d 523 (Okla. 1964); Winslow v. Winslow, 255 Wis. 347, 38
N.W.2d 430 (1949). Contra Matusow Mfg. Co. v. Weinraub, 81 Pa. D. & C. 96 (1952).
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its practical advantages, and then suggest that the remedy be extended to other
situations where theoretically it should also be available.
III. PRAcTIcAL ADVANTAGES OF THE ACCOUNTING:
SHARED BURDEN OF PROOF
The true accounting remedy, properly understood, offers tactical advan-
tages to the plaintiff. One advantage for the state court plaintiff is the
opportunity for a non-jury trial. 60 This, however, is relatively minor com-
pared to the tactical benefit offered by the shared burden of proof. The
prior discussion of the true accounting remedy in section II(A) shows that
the burdens of proof are allocated in a way that relieves the plaintiff of the
need to prove the precise, net amount claimed. 6' The plaintiff must establish
the right to an accounting and prove the gross amount claimed; the defendant
must then prove all offsetting expenses, losses and other deductions that he
claims. The significance of this depends upon the purpose for which the
accounting is sought and the extent to which it is difficult or impossible to
establish the various offsets claimed. Often, the plaintiff recovers where
otherwise he would lose.
The basic advantage of the shared burden of proof is that the plaintiff
gets judgment for the gross amount proven if the defendant fails or refuses
60. Framing a case as one of an equitable accounting permits a plaintiff to select a non-
jury trial in states using a historical test to decide when the constitutional right to jury trial is
preserved. However, in the federal courts, the decision in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469 (1962), has all but eliminated the ability to use an accounting to obtain a non-jury
trial. The impact of that decision on the "accounting" to settle complex or mutual accounts
is discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45. Even when the true accounting
remedy is sought, it is only in very limited circumstances that a jury trial may be avoided if
the defendant wishes one. If there is no issue of fact in common with a legal claim, a jury
trial still can be avoided when an accounting is sought against a trustee, a mortgagee, or in.
other cases where the obligation to account is of equitable, as distinguished from legal, origin.
Local No. 92, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. Norris, 383
F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1967) (trustee); Bonnell v. Commonwealth Realty Trust, 63 F.R.D. 616
(E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1975) (action against mortgagee in
possession to account for rents received); Coca-Cola Co. v. Cahill, 330 F. Supp. 354 (W.D.
Okla. 1971) (injunction and accounting for trademark infringement and unfair competition);
Coca-Cola Co. v. Wright, 55 F.R.D. 11 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (same); Nedd v. Thomas, 316 F.
Supp. 74 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (trustee); accord 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 45,
§ 38.25; 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2310 (1971). The
authors of the first cited treatise assert that there is no right to a jury trial if the case or issue
for an accounting is one formerly within the exclusive jurisdiction of equity "or is an incident
to a case or issue over which there is equity jurisdiction." 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 45, § 38.25, at 38-208. This quoted assertion seems wrong in light of an express statement
to the contrary in Dairy Queen:
At the outset, we may dispose of one of the grounds upon which the trial court
acted in striking the demand for trial by jury-that based upon the view that the
right to trial by jury may be lost as to legal issues where those issues are char-
acterized as "incidental" to equitable issues-for our previous decisions make it
plain that no such rule may be applied in the federal courts.
369 U.S. at 470.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
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to account. There are two different situations in which the plaintiff would
seek an accounting, and the degree of advantage that can be obtained depends
on the kind of case. Sometimes the plaintiff wants to compel the defendant
to account for the principal sum received, 62 and sometimes the plaintiff
wants to compel an accounting for profits made from the use of his property.6
The advantage of the remedy to the plaintiff varies inversely with the plain-
tiff's burden of proof, decreasing as his burden increases. While the plain-
tiff's burden generally is greater in the profits cases, and accordingly there
is a greater risk of recovering nothing, still there is a significant advantage
to the remedy in such cases. It is often harder to establish deductions and
offsets than the gross profits themselves, and the defendant bears the risk
that this will not be possible. Thus, once gross profits are established, the
plaintiff is assured of some recovery.
Two examples will illustrate these points. Suppose P delivers eight million
dollars to an agent, X, to acquire mineral leases. X makes the purchase,
but P suspects that he spent only four million and pocketed the balance. P
may compel an accounting for the principal sum delivered to X. Proof of
this amount should be relatively easy, and P gets judgment for the difference
between eight million and the value of the leases purchased where X cannot,
or will not, show that the full amount was spent or otherwise used for the
plaintiff's purpose. 64 In contrast, when the plaintiff seeks an accounting to
recover profits made from the use of his property, his burden of proof is
greater. He must prove the defendant's gross profits, and what he cannot
prove, he cannot recover. Still, the accounting offers a significant advantage
because it relieves the plaintiff of the need to prove net profits.
Suppose A and B agree to farm a small tract of land, A to supply the
land and capital and B to supply the labor, profits and losses to be shared
equally. After the growing season ends, B gives A the sum of $1,000 as
his share, offering no explanation of expenses. A may compel an accounting
for profits; upon proving that the crop was sold for $6,000, A gets judgment
for his share, one-half that amount, where B cannot or will not prove the
claimed expenses. 65 Obviously, this is a simple example, but the same ad-
vantage obtains in complicated cases as well. Often there are intricate ques-
tions of allocation of profits between those made from the plaintiff's property
and those made from other sources, as. well as intricate questions of appro-
priate deductions from gross profits. When an accurate calculation of net
62. E.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier, 489 F. Supp. 354 (D. Utah 1977); Cafritz v. Corporate
Audit Co., 60 F. Supp. 627 (D.D.C. 1945); and cases cited supra, notes 22-23.
63. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 25.
64. Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier, 489 F. Supp. 354 (D. Utah 1977).
65. Watson v. Fulk, 19 N.C. App. 377, 198 S.E.2d 730 (1973).
[Vol. 60:463
REMEDY OF ACCOUNTING
profits is difficult or impossible, the party with the burden of proof-the
defendant who must account-loses.
66
The operation of the accounting when the defendant fails to establish
expenses and other deductions from gross profits is explicitly spelled out in
the copyright and trademark statutes, offering further illustration of the
advantage of the shared burden of proof. The Copyright Act of 1976 allows
recovery of the infringer's profits, carrying forward an earlier codification
of the accounting remedy in such cases. 67 The statute provides that "[iun
establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required to present
proof only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is required to
prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable
to factors other than the copyrighted work. ' 68 This preserves for the co-
pyright plaintiff the advantages of the accounting.69 The federal trademark
law, which also allows recovery of the infringer's profits, is similarly explicit:
"In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's sales
only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed.
70
Here, too, the plaintiff obtains the advantages of the shared burden of proof
of the accounting remedy.7'
Looking to the reasons for which burdens of proof are allocated, and
looking back to the theory of the true accounting remedy, a strong argument
can be made that the entire burden of proof should be on the defendant.
That is, the defendant should bear the burden of proving gross as well as
net profits. This assertion is borne out by the two most common reasons
for allocating the burden of proof on a particular issue: to place it upon
66. E.g., Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. 489 (5th Cir. 1980); Lottie
Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 449 (2d Cir. 1978). Maltina was
an action for infringement of the plaintiff's trademark for the beverage malta, "a dark, non-
alcoholic carbonated beverage brewed similar to beer." 205 U.S.P.Q. at 490. The court held
the plaintiff was entitled to the defendant's gross profits when defendant failed to prove claimed
expenses or to prove that overhead expenses were increased by the infringement. Lottie Joplin was
a copyright infringement action against a record company which, after having been refused a
license, nonetheless included three Scott Joplin compositions in an album "Scott Joplin-His
Complete Works." The infringing material filled one side of a five record set. The court rejected
the defendant's bald assertion that the plaintiff was entitled to only ten percent of the profits:
"Absent evidence by defendant to dispute the contributions of these compositions to the
marketability of the album, we hold that the award of one-half of the profits from the complete
works was not unreasonable." 199 U.S.P.Q. at 453 (emphasis original). A good general
discussion of the issues appears in D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 253-54, 273-77 (1973). These problems
are usually considered in the context of specific wrongs where measurement of the defendant's
profits becomes an issue. See id. at 450-56 (copyright infringement), 480-86 (trademark in-
fringement); 1 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.13 (apportionment generally), § 2.7
(patent, copyright and trademark infringement), § 2.8(b) (misappropriation of trade secrets)
(1978).
67. 1 G. PALMER, supra note 66, § 2.7(a).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1982).
69. See generally M. NIM]ER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.01[A (1985).
70. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982).
71. See generally 4 R. CALmAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 22.49 (4th ed. 1983).
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the party with readier access to the information; and to place it in such a
way as to further some policy of substantive law.72 Both considerations point
to the defendant. He is the one who has earned the profit and has the best
information. He is also a wrongdoer who should be denied that profit in
order to prevent unjust enrichment. 7a The present remedy does not fully
accomplish this, particularly where the plaintiff seeks profits from the use
of his property. The plaintiff's recovery is currently minimized where the
amount of gross profits is uncertain, since all inferences are resolved against
the party with the burden of proof. Thus the defendant keeps what the
plaintiff cannot prove. This seems unwise as a matter of policy since it is
the wrongdoer, and not the victim, who should bear the risk when there
are questions about the fruits of the wrong.74 With the modification pro-
posed, the defendant has to prove both gross profits and all deductions
claimed. If there is uncertainty as to the amount of gross profits the doubts
are resolved against the defendant, and the plaintiff gets judgment for the
maximum amount fairly shown by the evidence.
Occasionally, the courts seem to suggest such a rule without saying so
directly. It is sometimes asserted that the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant once the plaintiff establishes the right to an accounting. 75 While
this is too broad a statement, as shown above, it may reflect the thought
that the defendant should have to prove all profits. In addition, there is
language in some opinions stating or suggesting that the accounting is only
a form of discovery, and that it is available whenever the plaintiff lacks
72. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 249-53 (2d ed. 1977); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
8 2486 (1940).
73. One must, of course, keep in mind that the plaintiff first has to establish some wrongful
conduct by the defendant which entitles the plaintiff to a restitutionary remedy. See, e.g., cases
cited supra note 22; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 66, §§ 2.1, at 50, 2.12, at 157-59, 164-65;
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 151 comment f, 157 (1937). A separate issue in the law of
restitution is whether restitution of profits should also be granted against the "innocent"
wrongdoer, that is, one who commits an unintended wrong. The authorities generally support
a mixed approach, keyed to the nature and degree of the wrong. E.g., D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.5 (1973); 1 G. PALMER, supra note 66, §§ 2.12, at 165-66, 2.14(b);
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 151 comment f, 154, 155, 202 comment c, 203 (1937).
74. See Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916), where the
court in a common law trademark infringement action held that the burden of proof was on
the defendant to show an apportionment of profits. The court noted that the allocation is
often impossible, and the wrongdoer should not profit at the expense of the victim. The point
is one of broader application and logically suggests the burden of proving all profits should
be on the defendant.
75. E.g., Rosenak v. Poller, 290 F.2d 748, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ("[the] burden cannot rest
upon plaintiff, but must shift to defendant once facts giving rise to a duty to account have
been alleged and admitted"); Dunn v. Baugh, 95 Idaho 236, 506 P.2d 463 (1973); see Randolph
Foods, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 253 Iowa 1258, 115 N.W.2d 868 (1962); Lile, supra note 5, at
189 (The author characterizes the accounting remedy as a "true bill for an account" when
sought in fiduciary cases, and distinguishes it from other uses of the remedy in this way: "There
are several striking contrasts between other bills for account, and the true bill for an account.
For instance, in the former the burden is ordinarily on the plaintiff to establish the amount
due, whereas in the latter the burden is uniformly on the defendant to present the account,
and to sustain its correctness by proper evidence." No authority is cited for this proposition.).
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information about the amount due him.7 6 In one sense, this confuses the
granting of discovery in cases of disputed accounts, now obsolete, with the
accounting for profits made from another's property. Yet there are elements
of compulsory disclosure when the true accounting is ordered, 7 since the
defendant must prove his claimed deductions or else suffer judgment in the
gross amount proved by the plaintiff. These cases may also reflect the thought
that this should be taken one step further and the defendant be required to
prove all profits.
A practical obstacle might be noted in response to the suggestion that the
defendant be required to prove all profits. What if the defendant fails or
refuses to account? There is no evidence of the amount due, so there can
be no judgment for the plaintiff. This is not the problem it would seem to
be, for two reasons. First, since the accounting is an equitable remedy, the
contempt power may be used to enforce the order to account. While such
power is inherent in the court's authority, today many jurisdictions have
statutes that expressly authorize the use of contempt to compel an ac-
counting.7 8 This should be quite sufficient, for the court may order the
defendant imprisoned for an indefinite term until he complies with the order
to account. Alternatively, if contempt enforcement is thought too harsh
under the circumstances, a receiver may be appointed to take possession of
the defendant's books and records and render the accounting.7 9 Second, in
the unlikely event the defendant chooses prison over accounting, there is
nothing to prevent the plaintiff from proving gross profits as he must do
under the current remedy. And, the plaintiff might so choose in any event
if this is quicker and less costly than bringing a contempt proceeding.
This section has examined a practical aspect of the accounting, noting its
advantages for maximizing the plaintiff's recovery. The suggestion that the
allocation of the burdens of proof be modified prompts consideration of
the theory underlying the remedy, and that subject is the focus of the next
section.
76. Rosenak v. Poller, 290 F.2d 748, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Remme v. Herzog, 222 Cal.
App. 2d 863, 865-66, 35 Cal. Rptr. 586, 588 (1964); Brea v. McGlashan, 3 Cal. App. 2d 454,
460, 39 P.2d 877, 880 (1935); see Anderson v. Clemens Mobile Homes, Inc., 214 Neb. 283,
288-89, 333 N.W.2d 900, 904 (1983); Bartoi v. Bartoi, 20 Misc. 2d 262, 266-67, 190 N.Y.S.2d
257, 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
77. One court sustained a claim of fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
raised by a defendant ordered to account, drawing an analogy to cases where discovery is
sought. Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier, 489 F. Supp. 354, 372-73 (D. Utah 1977).
78. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 53(d)(2) (master to whom case is referred to take account may
punish "as for contempt" failure of witness to appear or give evidence); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-402(c) (West 1982) (If the accounting party refuses to be sworn or answer questions,
"the auditors may commit him to a community correction center, there to continue until he
consents to be sworn and answer all proper interrogatories."). Money orders directing the
defendant to pay the amount due may also be enforceable by contempt in lieu of execution.
See, e.g., R. C. Gluck & Co. v. Tankel, 12 A.D.2d 339, 211 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1961).
79. O'Connor v. O'Connor, 320 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
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IV. THEORETICAL BASIS FOR EXTENDING THE
SCOPE OF THE ACCOUNTING
This final section complements the preceding practical discussion of the
value of the traditional remedy of accounting by exploring from a more
theoretical perspective its extension into other areas of law. Traditionally,
the rule was that an accounting was limited to fiduciary cases and cases
where the remedy was sought as incidental to other equitable relief such as
an injunction,8 ° recission,8' or specific performance.82 With the merger
of courts of law and equity, the traditional procedural constraints limiting
the accounting to fiduciary cases no longer apply. It seems rather clear that
the rule was a matter of jurisdictional accommodation between equity and
law in a dual system that has for the most part vanished today.13 Since there
is no functional distinction between fiduciary and other cases where the defend-
ant has profited from the wrongful use of the plaintiff's property, the ac-
counting should be extended accordingly.
Nonetheless, the courts have occasionally suggested that the old rule limiting
the accounting still applies in a few cases of copyright infringement," '
80. Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (1936) (injunction and accounting
for trespass to real property); A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2
N.J. 235, 66 A.2d 319 (1949) (injunction and accounting for profits for misappropriation of
trade secret); Schechter v. Friedman, 141 N.J. Eq. 318, 57 A.2d 251 (1948) (injunction and
accounting for tortious interference with contractual relations).
81. Reiter-Foster Oil Corp. v. Bennett, 104 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (rescission of
contract for purchase of land); Lang v. Giraudo, 311 Mass. 132, 40 N.E.2d 707 (1942) (rescission
of contract for sale of land); Brooks v. Conston, 364 Pa. 256, 72 A.2d 75 (1950) (rescission
of sale of business).
82. Bailly v. Betti, 241 N.Y. 22, 148 N.E. 776 (1925) (agreement to perform as the Flonzaley
Quartet).
83. United States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451 (1906); Root v. Lake Shore &
Mich. S. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189 (1882). In the Bitter Root case, the Court denied an accounting
to recover for timber wrongfully cut and taken from government lands. There was no allegation
of a fiduciary relationship nor that specific timber or proceeds were traceable to the defendant.
The Court held that equity could not compel an accounting for the wrongdoer's profits from
a tort, the appropriate remedy being an action at law for damages. In Root, a bill for an account-
ing was brought to recover the profits of a patent infringer. No injunction was sought because
the patent had expired. The Court held that the remedy was unavailable: "But it is nowhere
said that the patentee's right to an accounting is based upon the idea that there is a fiduciary
relationship created between him and the wrong-doer by the fact of the infringement, thus con-
ferring jurisdiction on a court of equity to administer the trust and to compel the trustee to account.
That would be a reductio ad absurdum, and, if accepted, would extend the jurisdiction of equity
to every case of tort, where the wrong-doer had realized a pecuniary profit from his wrong."
105 U.S. at 214.
84. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 193 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1951), aff'd,
344 U.S. 228 (1952).
85. Tubular Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Mt. Vernon Furnace & Mfg. Co., 2 F.2d 982
(E.D. I1. 1924).
86. Reynolds v. Whitin Mach. Works, 167 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
844 (1948); Merchants Importing, Inc. v. Kuhn & Schneider, Inc., 27 A.D.2d 709, 276 N.Y.S.2d
923 (1967); Richman v. Security Say. & Loan Assoc., 57 Wis. 2d 358, 204 N.W.2d 511 (1973).
Earlier cases are collected in Annot., 53 A.L.R. 815 (1928).
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trademark infringement,85 and fraud.16 In one line of New York cases, the
rule seems to have been applied although it is never mentioned: it is generally
held that an accounting is unavailable absent a fiduciary relationship where
a contract of sale, licensing agreement or einployment contract provides for
payment as a percentage of gross or net profits.8 7 Thus, for example, an ac-
counting cannot be had by the patent holder who sells for a percentage of
net profits; "8 or by the National Committee on the Observance of Mother's
Day, licensing its prestige and experience for a percentage of sales; 9 or by
the commission sales agent.9" These decisions are technically correct if the
theory of the accounting, as carried down from the common law action of
account, is strictly applied. In hone of these cases does the plaintiff have
technical legal title to any property in the defendant's possession; thus, under
traditional principles, no accounting is available. In identical circumstances,
however, if the dealings between the parties establish a fiduciary relationship,
a salesman' or a comic strip artist92 can compel his employer to account.
Functionally, the right to an accounting should not turn on the presence or
absence of a fiduciary relationship which was once a jurisdictional prerequisite
in now obsolete courts of equity.
Professor Palmer has observed that courts often grant restitution of the
wrongdoer's profits today without addressing the law-equity distinction,93
and this modern view should be uniformly, and expressly, adopted. If any
further demonstration of the wisdom of extending the accounting is neces-
sary, the extension of the constructive trust remedy provides an analogy for
a similar extension of the accounting remedy. The constructive trust and the
accounting are both equitable restitutionary remedies originally developed in
cases against fiduciaries. 94 The constructive trust has been broadened beyond
its fiduciary origins, and is now recognized as a general remedy for the
prevention of unjust enrichment. As such, it is available against the fiduciary
and non-fiduciary alike when the plaintiff seeks specific restitution of the
identifiable proceeds of his misappropriated property.95 The accounting should
87. Reichert v. N. MacFarland Builders, Inc., 85 A.D.2d 767, 445 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1981)
(employment agreement); Moscatelli v. Nordstrom, 40 A.D.2d 903, 337 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1972)
(employment agreement); Freeman v. Miller, 157 A.D. 715, 142 N.Y.S. 797 (1913) (employment
agreement); Wi~lier v. Dauber, 12 Misc. 2d 974, 171 N.Y.S.2d 615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (patent
licensing agreement).
88. Sinkwich v. E.F. Drew & Co., 2 A.D.2d 788, 153 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1956).
89. National Comm. on the Observance of Mother's Day, Inc. v. Kirby, Block & Co., 17
A.D.2d 390, 234 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1962).
90. Sanshoe Trading Corp. v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 122 Misc. 2d 585, 470 N.Y.S.2d 991
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 104 A.D.2d 337, 479 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1984).
91. Domay Constr. Corp. v. Doric Co., 221 Md. 145, 156 A.2d 632 (1960); Stuyvesant
Ins. Co. v. Keystate Ins. Agency, Inc., 420 Pa. 578, 218 A.2d 294 (1966).
92. Boyle v. Wegman, 25 Misc. 2d 193, 200 N.Y.S.2d 82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960).
93. 1 G. PALMER, supra note 66, § 2.12, at 165.
94. The fiduciary origins of the constructive trust are discussed in 1 G. PALMER, supra note
66, § 1.3, at 11-12. For a corresponding discussion of the fiduciary origins of the accounting,
see supra text accompanying notes 4-13. See also 1 G. PALMER, supra note 66, § 1.5, at 24-
27.
95. 1 G. PALMER, supra note 66, § 1.3, at 11-13.
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be recognized in an analogous way as another general remedy for prevention
of unjust enrichment, available when the plaintiff seeks a money judgment
for the defendant's profits from the wrongful use of the plaintiff's property.
A well-known New York decision implicitly recognized this approach in
granting an accounting against a non-fiduciary. In Fur & Wool Trading Co.
v. Fox,96 the New York Court of Appeals held that an accounting was
available where a tortfeasor wrongfully profited from the use of another's
property. Goods taken from the plaintiff were received and sold at a profit
by the defendant, who was aware of the theft. The plaintiff did not know
the sale price, and made no allegation that it could trace its property into
any identifiable proceeds in the defendant's hands. An accounting was sought
to compel the defendant to reveal and pay over the proceeds of the sale.
The court held that the accounting was available, notwithstanding the ad-
equacy of legal remedies and notwithstanding the availability of discovery
to determine the sum received. The court reasoned that the defendant still
could be deemed a constructive trustee because this was necessary to protect
the rights of the owner. As such, the defendant was obligated to account:
The method by which equity proceeds in all these cases is to turn the
wrongdoer into a trustee. If it may do so for the purpose of subjecting
identified funds to the claim of the defrauded party, I do not see why
it should not pursue the same method whenever it is necessary to protect
the rights of the original owner. In the case of an actual trustee the
cestui que trust may not only reclaim the trust property if he is able to
trace it, but, failing to trace it, he is entitled to an accounting and
personal judgment against the trustee. 97
In short, the reference to constructive trust may be read as suggesting an
analogy: just as the court will declare a wrongdoer to be a fictitious, "con-
structive" trustee so, too, the court will impose the obligation to account
on a wrongdoer when it is appropriate to order monetary restitution of
profits from the wrongful use of property. Admittedly, the court's statement
that the defendant may be declared a constructive trustee is ambiguous,
insofar as some identifiable fund or asset has always been thought essential
for a constructive trust. 98 But, interpreted in another way, the decision is
useful in suggesting that the accounting be used generally in non-fiduciary
cases. In the interest of uniformity and consistency, the accounting remedy
should be available whenever property is wrongfully obtained, by a fiduciary
or a non-fiduciary, if the circumstances make it unfair to permit retention
of profits made from the wrong.
96. 245 N.Y. 215, 156 N.E. 670 (1927).
97. Id. at 219, 156 N.E. at 671 (quoting Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N.Y. 261, 91 N.E. 582
(1910)).
98. Professor Palmer criticizes the case on this ground. I G. PALMER, supra note 66, §
1.5(c).
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CONCLUSION
The accounting remedy has thus been surrounded by a certain amount of
semantic confusion as the name of the remedy and the process of accounting
became synonymous. It is shown that there are several different remedies
called an "accounting," similar only in that all end in an order or judgment
for the payment of money. The true accounting yields a restitutionary award
of a defendant's profits; the "accounting" to settle complex or mutual
accounts functionally grants a non-jury trial; and a now obsolete remedy
also called an "accounting" compelled discovery in cases of disputed ac-
counts. The true accounting remedy, understood in historical context, offers
the practical advantage of the shared burden of proof: the plaintiff, after
establishing gross profits, wins by default if the defendant cannot prove
offsets or deductions claimed. Looking at this tactical advantage, and looking
further at the theory behind the accounting as a restitutionary remedy to
deprive the defendant of profits wrongfully obtained, it is suggested that
the entire burden of proof be placed on the defendant. This would reverse
the current situation, where the plaintiff loses if gross profits cannot be
established, and cast the risk of loss upon the defendant-wrongdoer.
Finally, a theoretical consideration of the accounting suggests that the
remedy be expanded to include the situation where a non-fiduciary has
profited from the wrongful use of another's property. The courts often grant
an accounting in such cases, but there is some suggestion that it still applies
only to fiduciaries. This point should be clarified, so that the same remedy
is equally available in functionally identical situations.
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